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 Abstract  
                    
A number of issues in the common law arise when agents make contracts on 
behalf of principals.  Should a principal be bound when his agent makes a contract on his 
behalf   that he would immediately wish to disavow?  The tradeoffs resemble those in 
tort, so the least-cost avoider principle is useful for deciding when contracts are valid, and 
may be the underlying logic behind a number of different doctrines in agency law.  In 
particular, an efficiency explanation can be found for the undisclosed principal rule, 
under which the principal is bound even when the third party with whom the contract is 
made is unaware that the agent is acting as an agent.   
 
                                                  




  The importance of agency in the common law is shown by its being the subject in 
1933 of the second (after Contracts) of the American Law Institute’s series of 
Restatements.  No business owner can do everything himself.  He must delegate some 
things to agents, and this is true not only for large corporations, but for any business with 
employees.  This is particularly true, of course, once the organization has more than one 
owner.  In partnerships, the partners act as each other’s agents.  And in corporations, the 
shareholders are completely unable to act on their own behalf; they delegate authority to 
a board of directors, which in turn delegates authority to officers.  Indeed, agency is one 
of the main themes of corporate law, and a standard introductory section of its textbooks  
 
The first Restatement was followed by a second, and now the third has reached 
draft stage (American Law Institute, 2000; see also DeMott, 1998, an article by the 
Restatement’s current Reporter).  Since the 1970’s agency has also been at the center of 
some of the most exciting research in economics.  Economists have used the idea of 
principal and agent to explain the intricacies of labor compensation, the organization of 
hierarchies, the design of securities, and a host of other problems (see, e.g., the books by 
Milgrom and Roberts, 1994; Spulber, 1999; and Rasmusen, 2001a).  In the paradigmatic 
model, a principal hires an agent to exert some kind of effort.  The agent is tempted to be 
slack in his effort and the principal tries to overcome this moral hazard by designing a 
contract under which agent compensation is based on output.  The economist’s issues are, 
to be sure, different from that of traditional agency law.  The economist’s concern is that 
the contract will not induce appropriate effort by the agent; the lawyer's concern is what 
happens when the agent is active, but his effort is mischanneled.   
 
The lawyer’s agent places an order with a supplier when he has been forbidden to 
do so; drives the principal’s delivery truck into a schoolbus; hires the wrong employee for 
the principal’s business, or sexually harasses a fellow worker.  For the economist, the 
agency problem is how to give the agent incentives for the right action; for the lawyer, it 
is how to mop up the damage when the agent has taken the wrong action.  The 
paradigmatic problem involves not just principal and agent, but a third party.
2  The 
agent’s misbehavior may not have any direct adverse effect on the principal.  The 
principal is not in the schoolbus that is wrecked by the agent, and unless the law enforces 
the contract, he is unhurt by the agent’s foolish or unauthorized purchases.  Third parties 
are harmed, however, so government intervention can aid efficiency.  When the agent 
takes a mistaken action, the damage must be allocated to someone---principal, agent, or 
third party. 
 
This kind of problem is intrinsically amenable to economic analysis.  Indeed, 
Judge Posner uses such analysis in his opinion dissenting from the Seventh Circuit in the 
two leading sexual harassment cases, Jansen v. Packaging Co. and Ellerth v. Burlington 
                                                           
2  A prominent area of agency law which does not involve third parties is the law of fiduciaries: 
whether the agent has acted properly on behalf of the principal, and how much the agent must 
compensate the principal for mistakes.  See Cooter and Freedman (1991).                                                     
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(1997), believing it to be more useful than application of the second Restatement of 
Agency, "that antiquated screed" (at 510)..
3  I have more faith than Judge Posner in 
antiquated screeds, however, and hope to show that many of the principles to be found in 
the common law of agency do have sound foundations--- not in the legal formalisms 
which courts try to use, but in economic analysis.  The economic approach has already 
been applied to one of the best-known problem of agency law:  what happens when an 
agent tortiously injures a third party.  The law deals with these involuntary creditors 
according to the doctrines of vicarious liability or respondeat superior, which make the 
principal liable for torts committed by his agent in the course of the agent’s duties.
4  
Here, we will address a different, but equally fundamental problem: what happens when 




2.  The Law of Agency 
  
The Restatement of Agency (Second) defines agency as "the fiduciary relation 
which results from the manifestation of consent by one person to another that the other 
shall act on his behalf and subject to his control, and consent by the other so to act."
6   In 
the present article, we shall take for granted that the agent does not assume the risks of 
the enterprise.  The problem of allocating loss from mistaken contracts is much easier 
when the loss can be put on the agent, but that case is relatively uninteresting because the 
theory is simple and the practical application is limited.  Ordinarily, the loss cannot be 
put on the agent, either because he is not rich enough or because he is a difficult target for 
litigation, having fled or protected his assets from legal judgements.  Moreover, while 
questions involving the agent’s liability for contracts are interesting, much of their 
analysis revolves around the contract between principal and agent rather than between 
                                                           
3For argument that the Supreme Court was wrong to apply agency law, see Phillips (1991).   
4Economic analyses of vicarious liability include Chu and Yingyi (1992), Kornhauser (1982), and 
Sykes (1984, 1988), as well as pages 204-209 of Landes and Posner (1987).  These do not, 
however, analyze the problem of mistaken contracts, and much of their emphasis is on why the 
tort victim should sue the principal rather than the agent.  See also Fischel and Sykes (1996), 
which explores similar issues with respect to whether corporations should be criminally liable.    
5 Contract agency law has received much less attention than contract tort law.  Three recent 
exceptions are Whincop (1997) (arguing that the formalist approach is incoherent and using game 
theory to suggest ten principles for agency contract law); Cohen (2000) (viewing deterrence of 
collusion between two of the three parties against the other as the basic principle of agency law); 
and Davis (1999) (his Section V, suggesting third-party monitoring of agents as a reason why 
their misrepresentations do not invalidate a contract).  Casadesus-Masanell and Spulber (2002) 
address the problem, but with little attention to specific laws.  Note, however, the suggestion of a 
“cheaper loss provider” in the 4th edition of the business associations casebook of Larry Ribstein 
and Peter Letsou (2003, Section 8.01, at 298).  
6American Law Institute (1958) (the Restatement).  Although I will rely on the Restatement as my 
guide to the law in this article, it should be kept in mind that it is not binding on judges, who are 
supposed to follow the decisions in their particular state.  Yet, ``The Restatement (Second) of 
Agency is the appropriate place to find the federal common law definition. Courts adopting a 
federal common law of agency generally follow the Restatement.” (Steinberg v. Mikkelsen  1995, 
at 1436)                                                   
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agent and third party, so agency issues are secondary.  The interesting cases from the 
point of view of agency law are those in which the agent has created a conflict between 
the principal and some third party, who must share the loss either because the efficient 
contract puts the risk there or because the agent cannot be made to pay.     
 
The common law provides six reasons why the principal may be bound by 
contracts made by the agent:
7  
 
1. Actual Express Authority.  The principal has entered into an explicit agreement with 
the agent authorizing him to take a particular action; the board of directors votes to 
authorize the president of their company to purchase a new office building. 
 
2. Actual Implied Authority.  The principal has entered into an explicit agreement to 
employ the agent, and although he has not specifically authorized the particular action at 
issue, the agent can reasonably infer that authority for that action has been delegated to 
him.  If the general manager of a department store hires clerks, the store is bound by his 
contract, even if he was not expressly granted that authority (Restatement, §52, 73).  
 
3. Apparent Authority.  The principal has no agreement with the agent authorizing the 
action, but a third party could reasonably infer from the principal’s conduct that the agent 
was authorized.
8  If the home office tells a customer that the sales manager has authority 
to sell flour without confirmation, and then withdraws that actual authority without 
telling the customer, the sales manager still has apparent authority.
9  Apparent authority 
depends on the beliefs of the third party, not on the actual relation between principal and 
agent.     
 
4. Estoppel.  The principal is "estopped" from objecting to the agreement made by the 
agent if the principal could have intervened to prevent the confusion over authority; e.g., 
if the principal overheard the agreement being made and failed to assert that the agent 
                                                           
7This discussion is taken from Chapter 1 of Klein and Ramseyer (1994), from Steffen (1977) and 
the Restatement.  I have adopted the categories of Klein and Ramseyer, but added estoppel as a 
separate category.  Not all jurisdictions use quite this catalog; Indiana, for example, seems to 
recognize just the three categories of actual authority, apparent authority, and authority by 
estoppel.  See Hope Lutheran Church v. Chellew (1984) and Secon Service System v. St. Joseph 
Bank and Trust (Easterbrook, J., 1988) at 36.         
8"Apparent authority is the power to affect the legal relations of another person by transactions 
with third persons, professedly as agent for the other, arising from and in accordance with the 
other’s manifestations to such third persons." (Restatement, §8)    
9As we shall see in Section 4, the law becomes less clear when the principal’s words did not 
create the apparent authority.  If a sales manager claims he has authority to sell flour without 
confirmation from the home office, and such sales are customary in the flour business, then does 
he have apparent authority?  Yes, says North Alabama Grocery Co. v. J.C. Lysle Milling Co. 
(1921), as described in Steffen (1977) at 128.  See also Restatement, §49.  Others, however, 
might classify this as inherent agency power, reaching the same outcome with a different 
doctrine.                                                       
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was unauthorized.
10  Black’s Law Dictionary (6
th edition, 1990) gives  a general 
definition: “…party is prevented by his own acts from claiming a right to detriment of 
other party who was entitled to rely on such conduct and has acted accordingly.”  As one 
opinion puts it, when applied to agency the following is needed:   
  
In order to prove agency by estoppel, the following elements must be established: 
(1) intentional or negligent acts of commission or omission by the alleged principal 
which created the appearance of authority in an agent; (2) reasonable and good faith 
reliance on the appearance of authority in the putative agent by the third party; and (3) a 
detrimental change in position by the third party due to its reliance on the agent’s 
apparent authority. (Minskoff Equities v. American Express, 1995)   
        
5. Ratification.  If no other authority exists, but the principal confirms the agent’s 
agreement once he learns about it, such ratification binds the principal; a flour salesman 
promises without authorization to sell eggs to a customer, and his employer later 
approves the agreement.  
 
6. Inherent Agency Power.  The agency relationship may somehow give the agent the 
power to harm third parties even if there is no manifestation by the principal that the 
agent is acting on his behalf.
11  "Inherent agency power" is a term invented to cover this 
source of liability, which was well known in the common law, if not by this name.
12  The 
term was formally introduced in 1958 in the Second Restatement, §8a of which says, 
"Inherent agency power is a term used in the restatement of this subject to indicate the 
power of an agent which is derived not from authority, apparent authority or estoppel, but 
solely from the agency relation and exists for the protection of persons harmed by or 
dealing with a servant or other agent."  
 
The best-known illustration of inherent agency power in the law of agency and 
contracts is the classic teaching case, Watteau v. Fenwick (1892).  Since this is perhaps 
the best-known case in the law of agency, raising as it does real problems for legal 
formalism, it is worth laying out in detail:  
                                                           
10But see Black’s Law Dictionary at 63, which seems to conflate estoppel with apparent authority: 
“Agency by estoppel: When the principal, by his negligence in supervising the agent, leads a third 
party to reasonably believe that the agent has authority to act for the principal.”  
11"Representations of the principal to the third party are central for defining apparent authority, 
but in contrast, inherent authority originates from the customary authority of a person in the 
particular type of agency relationship and no representations beyond the fact of the existence of 
the agency need be shown." (Cange v. Stotler, 1987)    
12See, for example, Hubbard v. Tenbrook (1889):  "The answer is not at all doubtful.  A man 
conducting an apparently prosperous and profitable business obtains credit thereby, and his 
creditors have a right to suppose that his profits go into his assets for their protection in case of a 
pinch or an unfavorable turn in the business."  The Hubbard court tries to justify this statement in 
terms of apparent authority and estoppel, but neither doctrine quite fits.  Not all states accept 
inherent agency power.    McKay (1994) discusses the current status of inherent agency power in 
state law, with special emphasis on Texas.  It is dropped from the draft of the Third Restatement 
(Tentative Draft No. 1 (March 20, 2000) xvii, 89).  See also Fishman (1987), which  briefly 
mentions the objective of encouraging the least-cost avoider to take precautions, at 54, though his 
article does not take the economic approach.                                                   
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 "From the evidence it appeared that one Humble had carried on business at a 
beer-house called the Victoria Hotel, at Stockton-on-Tees, which business he had 
transferred to the defendants, a firm of brewers, some years before the present action. 
After the transfer of the business, Humble remained as defendants’ manager; but the 
license was always taken out in Humble’s name, and his name was painted over the door. 
Under the terms of the agreement made between Humble and the defendants, the former 
had no authority to buy any goods for the business except bottled ales and mineral 
waters; all other goods required were to be supplied by the defendants themselves. The 
action was brought to recover the price of goods delivered at the Victoria Hotel over 
some years, for which it was admitted that the plaintiff gave credit to Humble only: they 
consisted of cigars, bovril, and other articles.  The learned judge allowed the claim for the 
cigars and bovril only, and gave judgement for the plaintiff for 22L. 12s. 6d.      
    
There is no actual authority, either express or implicit, for the agent to order the 
cigars, because he was expressly instructed not to order them.  There is no apparent 
authority, because the principal did nothing to convey the idea that the manager was 
acting as an agent.  The plaintiff might be estopped from denying that Humble was his 
agent, since Humble was put in a position to so act, but estoppel would only permit 
recovery of the cost of the goods to the seller, not their price.  Ratification does not apply.  
All that remains is "inherent agency power": the ability of the manager, based on his 
employment by the principal, to harm third parties by making contracts.  
   
  When analyzing a given case between a principal and a third party involving 
liability for a contract made by an agent, a court can draw upon a number of doctrines, 
but the variety of doctrines is a sign more of the difficulty the court is in than of the ease 
with which it can find a definite solution.  The doctrines require considerable thought in 
their application.  What makes authority "express"?  How apparent does "apparent 
authority" have to be?  When does the judge pull out the last resort of "inherent agency 
power"?  All of these doctrines are applied haphazardly, giving rise to the suspicion that 
judges are deciding how the cases should come out on common-sense grounds (usually 
quite reasonably) and then groping for legal formalisms.
13  
  
                                                           
13See Whincop (1997) for a discussion of the confusion of the formalist approach, with 
illustrations from Australian cases.  His list of proposed new doctrines may be seen to come to 
much the same conclusions as existing law, however, and fits well with the least-cost avoider 
analysis below.  Examples of items are: 
"(4)  The contractor’s ability to enforce a contract should be limited where the transaction 
is one where the contractor would normally collect information concerning the client before a 
decision to proceed the transaction was made, but did not in fact do so. 
  (5)  A company should not be able to assert against the contractor a nonstandard 
allocation or delegation of power.” 
Two interesting recommendations he makes are:  
“(8)  Civil remedies should permit courts to divide the loss of unauthorised transactions 
where the taking of precautions by both parties is desirable. 
  (9)  Where the incidence of unauthorised dealings is very low for the sort of transaction 
involved in the instant case, the loss should lie where it falls.”                                                  
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I agree with Judge Hand that agency law does reach the right results, even if 
agency doctrine is not always clear.  As in other areas of the law where morality and legal 
rules leave us in confusion, efficiency may here come to our aid as a unifying principle of 
considerable appeal.  It will be particularly appealing here as a justification and 
clarification for the doctrines above rather than merely replacing them outright. We will 
thus explore an efficiency interpretation of the sources of authority in Section 3. 
  
 
3.  A Model of Contracts Made by Agents 
  
    A formal model may help to clarify the tradeoffs involved in agency law, even 
though we shall not mathematically manipulate it here.   The principal wishes to buy a 
good he values at Vp, which costs the third party a lesser sum Vt to produce.  The 
principal can either buy the good directly, at transaction cost cna, or hire an agent, at the 
lower cost ca,.  With probability f, the agent mistakenly orders the wrong good, which the 
principal values at only (Vp-X) and which cannot be resold for more than that amount.  
The agent error has a probability given by a convex function f(cp, ct) which is decreasing 
in cp and ct, the care the principal and the third party take to prevent the error, with 
diminishing returns to each kind of care.   
 
 Our focus will be on the choice of the care levels cp and ct.  The principal’s care, 
cp, has a large number of interpretations. It is he who has made an agreement with the 
agent, and at some cost he can incorporate incentives to deter agent error. This cost 
includes the cost of formulating and negotiating the agreement, the cost of compensating 
the agent for his increased effort to avoid errors, and the cost of incentives under 
imperfect information (e.g., increased risk-bearing by the agent and the real costs of 
punishments).  The principal can also exert care by choosing agents carefully and by 
monitoring them to increase the agent’s incentives to avoid error and to catch erroneous 
contracts before any reliance costs are incurred.  The care level cp incorporates all these 
avenues of error avoidance.  
 
 The third party has less scope for avoiding agent error because he does not select 
or compensate the agent.  His chief advantage is that he is on the spot when the contract 
is being formed, so he can detect some errors more easily.  Even if he does not know the 
principal’s desire perfectly, the third party can detect gross agent errors, take care to 
avoid inducing agent error, ask about the agent’s instructions, and contact the principal 
directly for confirmation. These comprise the care level ct. 
 
 If no agent is used, the principal pays the transaction cost.  The price is falling in 
cna, so the principal and the third party share any reduction in the transaction cost.  The 
principal receives a direct benefit, paying out a smaller cna, and the third party receives an 
indirect benefit, a higher price.  
 
  If the agent is used, an error may occur, in which case it is efficient to breach the 
erroneous contract and write a new contract correcting the error.  The individual payoffs 
depend on who pays the agent, and on the legal rule.  The social surplus regardless of the                                                  
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legal rule, consists of the gains from trade, (Vp- Vt), the expected loss due to error, f(cp, ct) 
X, the cost of the agent’s effort, ca, and the care taken to avoid error, (cp+ct).  All these 
exist regardless of the legal rule, which will only affect the levels of cp and ct, unless it 
completely chokes off use of the agent.   
 
In the first best, the agent is used if he reduces expected transaction costs.  If the 
probability of agent error falls, the principal receives a direct gain, bearing the mistake 
cost of X less often, but the third party receives an indirect gain, a higher price.  The 
agent reduces transaction costs, to the benefit of both parties, and both parties should be 
interested in a legal rule that encourages efficient monitoring.  It is not true that when the 
principal hires the agent it helps the principal alone.  A reduction in transaction costs 
helps both sides of the transaction.   
 
 This is itself an important point about agency.  The agent helps both sides of the 
transaction, and an efficient legal rule benefits both buyer and seller.  As a result, it is 
wrong to try to decide whether someone is the buyer’s agent or the seller’s agent by 
discovering who is the beneficiary of his actions.  Everyone is a beneficiary.  A better 
approach is to ask who has control over the agent, which in fact is the usual legal rule. 
Both parties, however, have some control over him, as in the model above, where both 
principal and third party can take care to prevent agent mistakes. The principal has 
authority, and usually has more control, but his power is limited by his absence from the 
time and place of the transaction. 
 
Consider a real estate broker selling a house.  He is the seller’s agent, owing a 
fiduciary duty to the seller, and the seller pays him the commission.  At the same time, he 
does have duties to buyers, he spends much more time with them than with the seller, and 
he depends on buyers for success in gaining any commission at all.  Moreover, from an 
economic point of view, the buyer pays the commission just as much as the seller does.  
Appearances are so deceiving that buyers commonly and wrongly believe that the broker 
is acting on their behalf, not the seller’s, and owes them fiduciary duties.  That is false,
14 
but it can easily happen that the broker is much more useful to the buyer than to the 
seller, his principal.  It may happen that absent the broker, the seller could find many 
equivalent buyers for his house, but that the buyer could not find any house that so well 
met his needs. 
 
   While it is clear that an effective agent helps both principal and third party, the 
great question in agency law is which should bear responsibility for the agent’s mistakes 
or malfeasance.  We can use efficiency as a criterion, asking what legal rule would bring 
us closest to the optimal levels of care, cp and ct and thereby make both parties better off 
ex ante.  The difficulty is that care by both principal and third party is desirable. Contract 
law ordinarily either upholds or voids an agreement.  If the rule is that mistakes by an 
agent are immaterial to the validity of a contract, the third party will not take care. If the 
                                                           
14For example: ``(c) A broker engaged by a seller or landlord owes no duties or obligations to the 
buyer or tenant except that a broker shall treat all prospective buyers or tenants honestly and shall 
not knowingly give them false information.’’ (Indiana Code, §25-34.1-10-10, 1996)                                                    
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rule is that mistakes by the agent void a contract, the principal will not take care.
15    Nor 
would it be enough to go beyond standard contract doctrine to something more like tort 
law’s comparative negligence, sharing the cost of agent error between principal and third 
party.
16  This would give each some, but not sufficient, incentive to take care.  
 
 The problem is a variant of the "moral hazard in teams" problem described by 
Holmstrom (1982).  His work implies that any legal rule sharing damages will be 
inefficient unless it has one of two features: 
 
(1) The rule destroys value by imposing punishments on both the principal and the third 
party following agent error.  
 
(2) The rule makes use of the care levels cp and ct, in allocating liability, punishing 
suboptimal care. 
 
In Holmstrom’s original context of labor contracts, feature (1) takes the form of 
docking all the workers' pay if their joint output is so low as to show that at least one 
worker shirked.  Workers will agree to this in advance knowing that in equilibrium 
nobody will shirk under this threat, and if someone did, the employer would gladly carry 
out the threat.  In the context of an erroneous contract, the court would impose the entire 
loss on each party.  Each would then provide the efficient care level, but they would have 
a strong disincentive to enforce the agreement in court ex post, even if a court would 
enforce such a contract clause. 
 
Feature (2) is not ordinarily a feature of contract law, but it is the dominant 
feature of tort law, which often assigns liability based on negligence.  Agency law often 
seems a hybrid between tort and contract. It has the contract feature of agreement 
between two parties, but the tort features that the two parties-- principal and third party--  
do not meet and the harm is unintentional. 
 
                                                           
15For a straightforward algebraic analysis of the effect of different legal rules, see the early, more 
technical version of this paper, Eric Rasmusen, The Economics of Agency Law and Contract 
Formation, May 8, 1995, http://Php.Indiana.edu/~erasmuse/papers/agency.1995.pdf (March 3, 
2001).    
16 Posner (1986) suggests that unlike in tort, in contract it is usually very clear that only one party 
could have prevented breach.  The performer failed to perform, which the payer could not 
prevent, or the payer failed to pay, which the performer could not prevent.  An exception to the 
indivisibility of liability is the rule of Hadley v. Baxendale, under which the breacher is not liable 
for unforeseeable damages (Hadley v. Baxendale, 1854).  Since he does pay compensation only 
for the immediate damages from breach, this splits total damages.  It allocates each type of 
damage completely to one party or the other, however, and the unforeseeability of the 
uncompensated damages from the point of view of the breacher means that it would be inefficient 
to make him liable for them.  A more obscure example is the provision in the Mongolo-Oirat 
Regulations of 1640 that if a third party buys stray cattle from a finder the loss is split--  the 
original owner is entitled to the head and the third party to the rump.  Similar splits were common 
in other areas of accident law in Mongolia (Levmore, 1987).                                                     
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As a result, the Coase Theorem is less helpful than it usually is in contract 
situations.   Ordinarily, discussions of the economics of contract law qualify their 
conclusions by saying that the welfare loss from an inefficient legal default rule is limited 
to transaction costs, because the parties can always contract around the inefficient rule.  
That is more difficult when such contracting-around must be done by the very agent 
whose errors are the source of the problem.  The limitation on losses only applies in the 
sense that the parties can always dispense with using an agent if agency law is too 
inefficient.  Not using the agent could be the second-best-efficient outcome, if optimal 
care levels by both principal and third party still result in high agency costs, since if the 
third party must bear the cost of agent mistakes, he may decide to refuse to deal with 
agents in dubious circumstances and insist on direct negotiation with the principal.  
Shavell (1980) has made a similar point in the tort context: if an activity is inherently 
risky, an efficient tort rule should discourage the level of the activity to some extent as 
well as encouraging proper care when the activity is still undertaken.  If the agent is to be 
retained, however, contracting around inefficient default rules is unsatisfactory, because 
it is the untrustworthy agent himself who is handling the contracting for the principal.
17     
 
A more important result of the tort features is that agency law is a field where the 
older, "Posnerian" style of law and economics still has much to teach us, because the 
least-cost avoider principle of tort applies.  The least-cost avoider-principle, broadly 
stated, asks which party has the lower cost of avoiding harm, and assigns liability to that 
party.  This is not entirely satisfactory, since it reduces the incentive for the other party to 
take care, and we are unlikely to get both cp and ct, exactly right, but the principle has 
wide application and is simple enough for judge and jury to use. Moreover, not only does 
it have desirable efficiency properties, encouraging the parties to take some but not 
excessive precautions ex ante, it also accords with common ideas of fairness, putting the 
loss on the party who most people think deserves it in cases where everyday intuition 
does apply.
18  Section 4 will examine different types of error, and show how the six 




4.  Application of the Least-Cost Avoider Principle 
 
A.  The Sources of Authority  
 
   The six sources of agent authority described in Section 2 can all be derived from 
the least-cost avoider principle, which explains why it is often more difficult to decide 
which legal doctrine applies in a particular case than to decide where the law places 
liability. 
 
1.  Actual Express Authority      
                                                           
17 See the Corrupt Treasurer Case in Section 4.B below for an example; the person to ask about 
whether a transaction was authorized was himself the source of the problem.   
18One might go further and say that the efficiency properties of the rule are why it seems fair, but 
that is a subject for a different article.                                                     
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When the agent has actual express authority, the principal will usually be the 
least-cost avoider.   
         
Illustration 1: Principal Mistake.  P hires A to buy goods from TP.  A orders the goods 
from TP.  Soon afterwards, P realizes that he cannot make use of the goods.  Must P 
accept delivery and pay TP?   
 
In Illustration 1, the agent’s role is trivial.  He carries out the wishes of the 
principal to the letter, and when the principal is mistaken ex post, it is not because he 
employed an agent.  It is a useful starting point, however, because both P and TP could 
conceivably have prevented the harm, yet we place responsibility on P.  Why not have a 
rule that says that sellers must take due care that the buyers can really use the goods?  




P is the natural least-cost avoider, because he should know better than anyone 
what goods he wants and how much he is willing to pay for them.  Determining even 
one’s own tastes is costly, but trying to determine someone else’s is usually more 
difficult. This is particularly true when an agent is used, because TP does not even meet P 
face to face and so has little idea of P’s motivation.  
 
Even so simple a point, however, has its exceptions.  Although P knows his tastes 
best, if TP knows the goods he is selling best, it may be TP who can most cheaply avoid 
mistaken contracts.  This is the basis for the formation defenses of fraud and 
misrepresentation which a defendant may use when accused of breach of contract.  It is 
also the basis for many common business practices such as warranties and explicit or 
implicit money-back guarantees.  Warranties are a good example, however, of how if the 
legal default is that P is responsible, but TP is the least-cost avoider, the contract can be 
modified to shift the risk of mistake onto TP.    
 
 
2.  Actual Implied Authority  
 
 In Illustration 1, the considerations involved differ little from when a contract is 
made without an agent, except for TP’s high cost of discovering the motivation of the 
party with whom he is ultimately contracting.  When actual implied authority is involved, 
the distinct features of agency come into play, because of the possibility that the agent 
acts in a way that the principal did not intend and would repudiate immediately upon 
discovering it.
20     
                                                           
19  On occasion, the law does recognize that a party to a contract can be protected from his own 
carelessness.  Scriveners’ errors are an example:  if there is a clear drafting error, such as a 
missing decimal place, courts will not enforce a contract as written. See Ayres and Rasmusen 
(1993).  
20The difference between actual and implied authority is distinct from the difference between a 
special and a general agent:  "(1) A general agent is an agent authorized to conduct a series of 
transactions involving a continuity of service.  (2) A special agent is an agent authorized to                                                  
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Illustration 2:  Agent Mistake.  P hires A as manager for his grocery store.  A orders fresh 
fruit from TP, and orders more than P desired.  Is P liable on the agreement?   
  
P is liable on the contract because general managers have the implied authority to 
place orders for fruit.  This is a more difficult case than Illustration 1, however. We 
cannot just say that the buyer is responsible for his promises, because in Illustration 2, A 
is acting contrary to P’s wishes, even if unintentionally.  Unlike in Illustration 1, if A 
were not employed, the mistaken order would not have occurred, so A is not simply 
acting in place of P.  P has, however, intended for A to make contracts of this kind, and 
knows there is some possibility A will place the wrong order.  In this sense, P intended 
that A place a certain number of wrong orders.  This is the same tradeoff between 
reducing transaction costs and increasing error costs modelled in Section 3.  Viewed this 
way, actual implied authority is close to inherent agency power: the principal has put the 
agent in a position where the agent can inflict harm on third parties.  
 
  The least-cost avoider principle helps clear away some of the confusion over 
authority.  We must ask what general rule of liability would result in the least cost of 
avoiding this kind of mistake.  The principal has a variety of means available to reduce 
the risk of agent mistakes.  He hires the agent, and so can select an agent with the 
appropriate talents.
21  He can negotiate a contract to give him incentive to use those 
talents properly.
22  He can instruct the agent to a greater or lesser extent, choosing the 
level of detail in light of the costs of instruction and mistake.  He can expressly instruct 
the agent not to take certain actions, and tell third parties about the restrictions.
23  He can 
monitor the agent, asking for progress reports or randomly checking negotiations that are 
in progress.  The principal’s control over the agent, a basic feature of the agency 
relationship, gives him many levers with which to reduce the probability of mistakes.  
 
Analogs of some of these levers are available to the third party.  He can refuse to 
deal with with an insufficiently talented agent, though this requires incurring costs to test 
the agent’s talent.  Such testing may be no more difficult for the third party than for the 
principal, but the principal often will be able to spread the fixed cost of testing the agent 
over many transactions that the agent will make for him.  The third party could sign a 
                                                                                                                                                                             
conduct a single transaction or a series of transactions not involving continuity of service."  
Restatement, §3. 
21"Where one of two innocent persons must suffer, the loss should be borne by him who put the 
wrongdoer in a position of trust and confidence and thus enabled him to perpetrate the wrong."  
(Rykaczewski v. Kerry Home, Inc., 1960, at 465). 
22See the syllabus in Union Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Wilkinson (1871):  "This principle [that 
insurance salesmen are agents of the seller, not the buyer] is rendered necessary by the manner in 
which these agents are sent over the country by such companies, and stimulated by them to 
exertions in effecting insurance, which often lead to a disregard of the true principles of insurance 
as well as fair dealing."  
23If not communicated to the third party, such withdrawal may not affect the manager’s power to 
take such actions, because he may still have apparent authority, but the principal can punish the 
agent for taking forbidden actions. This (and simply the avoidance of mistakes) is the chief use of 
hidden instructions, as in Watteau v. Fenwick.                                                  
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contract with the agent, specifying that the agent will be punished if the principal 
disavows the contract, but, again, it may not be worth tailoring a separate incentive 
contract for each transaction.  Or, the third party could monitor the agent by checking 
with the principal to confirm the transaction.  Sometimes this may be efficient, but the 
trouble to which it puts the principal brings into question the usefulness of hiring an agent 
in the first place.  In light of this, it makes sense to have the principal liable as a general 
rule when the agent has actual implied authority.  
       
 
3.  Apparent Authority     
 
Apparent authority rests on conduct or words of the principal which lead the third 
party to believe reasonably that the agent is acting with authority.
24       
 
Illustration 3: The Lingering Agent Problem.  P discharges A, his general selling agent, 
but gives no notice to others.  Shortly thereafter, A contracts to sell goods by separate 
contracts to X, Y and Z.  X had known of A’s former employment.  A showed Y a letter 
from P to A signed by P, stating that A is employed as P’s selling agent.  Z had not 
known of A’s employment and relied wholly on A’s oral statement.
25  Do X, Y, and Z 
have valid contract claims against P? 
 
   The Restatement says that X and Y have valid claims, but Z does not.  This 
corresponds to the least-cost avoider principle, because for X and Y to check the authority 
of every well-known or documented agent for every transaction would be more costly 
than to require P to notify his customers that A has been fired and to demand return of 
letters of authority.
26  Furthermore, even if the cost to P of retrieving his letter of 
authority is high, imposing liability on P discourages him from issuing such a dangerous 
letter in the first place.  Some other sign of authority may be less easily abused.  Z, on the 
other hand, has exerted no care to determine that A is P’s agent, and P’s cost of 
                                                           
24Apparent authority can be either apparent express authority or apparent implied authority, but I 
have not seen this terminology used anywhere.    
25Restatement, §159.  Something very close to Illustration 3 comes up in the Bible:  "And he said 
also unto his disciples, There was a certain rich man, which had a steward; and the same was 
accused unto him that he had wasted his goods.  And he called him, and said unto him, How is it 
that I hear this of thee? give an account of thy stewardship; for thou mayest be no longer steward.  
Then the steward said within himself, What shall I do? for my lord taketh away from me the 
stewardship: I cannot dig; to beg I am ashamed.  I am resolved what to do, that, when I am put 
out of the stewardship, they may receive me into their houses.  So he called every one of his 
lord’s debtors unto him, and said unto the first, How much owest thou unto my lord?  And he 
said, An hundred measures of oil. And he said unto him, Take thy bill, and sit down quickly, and 
write fifty.  Then said he to another, And how much owest thou? And he said, An hundred 
measures of wheat.  And he said unto him, Take thy bill, and write fourscore.  And the lord 
commended the unjust steward, because he had done wisely: for the children of this world are in 
their generation wiser than the children of light." (Luke 16:1-8, King James Version)   
26This is close to the former dealer rule in partnership law, that when a partnership is dissolved, 
an erstwhile partner still has the power to obligate the firm until former dealers on credit are 
notified of the dissolution.  See Steffen (1977) at 51 or U.P.A. §35.                                                    
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advertising to every potential customer that every potential salesman is not his agent is 
prohibitively high.   
 
The word "reasonably" should tip off the reader that apparent authority is the 
source of many disputes.  Three of them will help illustrate the problems of the third 
party in discovering that the agent’s authority is only apparent.   
  
The Burnt Cotton Case: TP Cannot Discover Actual Authority.  In 1863, TP sold 144 
bales of cotton to A, P’s agent, for 40 cents a pound.  Before the cotton could be put on a 
boat, 90 bales were burned.  P had instructed A to buy at an average price of 30 cents a 
pound and not vest ownership till delivery at Memphis, so A violated instructions.  Must 
P pay for the burnt cotton?  (Butler v. Maples, 1869) 
 
The U.S. Supreme Court agreed that P must pay.  A did have express authority to 
buy cotton for P, subject though he was to secret instructions on how to do it.  For TP to 
delay and ask P if A had authority was impractical.  Having the express authority to be a 
general agent, A had the apparent authority to pay the market price for typical terms of 
delivery.
27   
 
The Lawyer Madnick Case:  TP Cannot Cheaply Discover Actual Authority.  Principal 
Rothman hired agent lawyer Madnick to represent him in a tort suit against third party 
Fillette.  Pennsylvania law requires express authority for a lawyer to settle a case for his 
client.  Madnick settled the Rothman’s case without such authority, forged his signature, 
and cashed the $7,000 check for himself.  Five years later, after Madnick had been 
disbarred and convicted of forgery unconnected with this case, Rothman sought to reopen 
his case.  Can he-- and does the $7,000 count as being paid to Rothman?  (Rothman v. 
Fillette, 1983)   
 
A lower court thought that third party Fillette ought to have taken more care to 
check on Rothman’s authority.  The appellate court found this absurd and reversed, 
saying, 
  
   "The lower court suggested the following methods for an insurer to ascertain the 
attorney’s authority prior to consummating settlement: (1) compare the signature on the 
release with the signature in the files; (2) require the release to be notarized; (3) request 
the claimant to personally execute the release in their presence; and/or, (4) obtain 
permission to contact the claimant in order to verify settlement.  
 
In our judgment these suggestions are impractical and of little utility for the 
objectives sought to be achieved. (Rothman v. Fillette, 1983, at 267)       
 
                                                           
27Nowadays, UCC ￿2-509 would seem to put the loss on the seller in a case like this since the 
burning occurred before the cotton was put on the carrier.  This was not a point mentioned in the 
Supreme Court’s opinion, though, so it would seem the relevant law was different then.                                                    
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Fillette could have undertaken all four of these checks on Madnick’s authority, 
but at a significant cost, given the unlikelihood of encountering forgery from an attorney.  
Even in the modern age of telephone and fax, checking up is not cheap.
28 
 
The Antigua Loan Case:  P would Prefer not to be Bothered by TP’s Inquiries.  Antigua’s 
ambassador to the United Nations borrowed $250,000 from First Fidelity Bank, 
purportedly to refurbish the embassy, but actually to invest in a casino.  He could not 
repay, and agreed to a settlement.  Was Antigua liable, and was the settlement valid?  
(First Fidelity Bank, N.A. v. Antigua and Barbuda, 1989).     
   
This case illustrates how high the cost of checking on authority can be.  American 
banks do not have in-house knowledge of Antiguan government procurement procedures.   
Note, too, that not only the third party, but the principal, directly bears costs from 
verifying agent authority.  The Court held that the ambassador may have had apparent 
authority, depending on the fact of whether the bank should have known. One judge 
dissented, objecting to remand on the grounds that apparent authority was obvious 
enough not to need a determination of fact: 
  
 ...foreign governments generally will not appreciate inquiries from American 
vendors as to the authority of their ambassadors to obtain goods or services. …  And how 
is the vendor to avoid all risk?  It cannot obtain a routine resolution of borrowing 
authority from a corporation’s board of directors. Must it inquire of the foreign ministry, 
the parliament, the head of state?  Or should it examine the internal legal regulations that 
govern the purchasing and borrowing authority of each country’s ambassadors?  None of 
these alternatives seems likely to promote this country’s relationships with foreign states.     
 
A third party who supplies an embassy (or a UN mission) with champagne or 
credit expects payment, not an opportunity to persuade a trial court that its ignorance of 
an ambassador’s lack of actual authority was not willful.  (First Fidelity Bank, N.A. v. 
Antigua and Barbuda, 1989, at 199). 
 
   Thus, for a variety of reasons, the principal may be the least-cost avoider of agent 
error even when this requires going beyond issuing careful instructions to the agent with 
credible threats of punishment for disobeying those instructions.
29 
                                                           
28This reasoning is persuasive as far as concluding that third party Fillette ought to be credited 
with the $7,000 he paid agent Madnick.  A dissenting appellate judge agreed with this, but 
thought that Rothman ought to have been allowed to pursue his claim for anything in excess of 
$7,000.  Oddly, neither majority nor dissent returns to the seemingly decisive fact that the 
Pennsylvania statute requires express authority, not just apparent authority, for a settlement.  
29Curiously, the U.S. federal government has protections under federal common law not available 
to other principals.  In 1995, a federal judge agreed with plaintiff Dupuis that the Federal Home 
Loan Mortgage Corporation was an undisclosed principal for the bank she dealt with and would 
liable to her, but "Despite FHLMC’s liability at common law (federal or Maine), I conclude that 
the Merrill doctrine ultimately provides a complete defense to FHLMC on all of Dupuis’s 
contract claims." (Dupuis v. Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation, 1995, at 144 )   
The Merrill doctrine was created by the U.S. Supreme Court in 1947.  Justice Frankfurter 
wrote that despite "…the theory of the trial judge, that since the knowledge of the agent of a 
private insurance company, under the circumstances of this case, would be attributed to, and                                                  
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These cases also illustrate a difficulty in defining apparent authority as a legal 
concept.  I began this section with "Apparent authority rests on conduct or words of the 
principal…".  Illustration 3 did not have this problem.  If P tells TP that A has authority, 
and then P cancels the authority without telling TP, then A clearly has apparent authority 
but not actual authority.  If A tells TP that A has authority to act for P, when A in fact has 
never met P, then A does not have apparent authority.  A maxim of agency law is that an 
agent cannot create his own authority.  But what if P’s conduct has led TP to believe that 
A has authority?  The lines between apparent authority, agency by estoppel, and inherent 
agency power then become hazy.  In the Burnt Cotton Case, the Lawyer Madnick Case, 
and the Antigua Loan Case, the agent is chiefly to blame for the false appearance of 
authority, but the principal put him in a position to create that false appearance.  The 
least-cost avoider principle applies relatively simply, but deciding which formalist legal 
category applies is more difficult.  
 
 
4.  Agency by Estoppel  
 
   Estoppel is based on the ease with which someone could have prevented harm to 
himself.  Having failed to prevent the harm, he is "estopped" from asserting what would 
otherwise be a valid claim.   
 
Illustration 4: Estoppel.  "P learns that A, who has no authority or apparent authority to 
sell P’s goods, is negotiating with TP as P’s agent for their sale.  He does nothing 
although he could easily notify TP.  TP pays A for the goods, as is customary in such a 
transaction."
30  Must P deliver the goods? 
 
On pure agency grounds, P would be free to refuse to deliver the goods, because 
A is not his agent and P’s manifestations did not deceive TP.  Instead, the law requires 
                                                                                                                                                                             
thereby bind, a private insurance company, the Corporation is equally bound," the Court would 
hold that, "Whatever the form in which the Government functions, anyone entering into an 
arrangement with the Government takes the risk of having accurately ascertained that he who 
purports to act for the Government stays within the bounds of his authority." (Federal Crop Ins. 
Corp. v. Merrill, 1947, at 383).  The liability of the sovereign is based on its waiver of sovereign 
immunity,  which courts construe narrowly;  in an opinion ruling that the Commissioner of the 
Internal Revenue Service’s agreement to a tax settlement was invalid despite his apparent 
authority because by statute he lacked actual authority without the explicit concurrence of the 
Secretary of the Treasury, the Court said,  “When a statute limits a thing to be done in a particular 
mode, it includes the negative of any other mode.” (Botany Worsted Mills v. U.S., 1928, at 289)   
Note that in his Merrill dissent, Justice Jackson uses the least-cost avoider idea:  "To my 
mind, it is an absurdity to hold that every farmer who insures his crops knows what the Federal 
Register contains or even knows that there is such a publication.  If he were to peruse this 
voluminous and dull publication as it is issued from time to time in order to make sure whether 
anything has been promulgated that affects his rights, he would never need crop insurance, for he 
would never get time to plant any crops." (Merrill, at 387)  
30Restatement, §8B.  See also §31, Estoppel to Deny Authorization.                                                  
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him to deliver the goods on grounds of estoppel: he could have prevented the 
misunderstanding by repudiating A’s statement, but he did not.  
 
This is clearly justified by the least-cost avoider principle.  Even though P did not 
hire A, he is the least-cost avoider because he can prevent the mistake more cheaply than 
TP can.  He is therefore liable for the resulting harm (Restatement, §8B.  See also §31, 
Estoppel to Deny Authorization).      
 
The common law generally does not impose liability for nonfeasance, only for 
malfeasance, as in the lack of a duty to rescue.  That principle does not apply to agency, 
as the Restatement explains in a special section on "Estoppel by silence":  "The laissez-
faire common law rule which imposes no duty to aid others has probably been retained in 
its extreme form because of the difficulty in fixing limits and in the agency situation, not 
only is the purported principal in the best position to prevent the harm, but also it is 
usually not difficult to ascertain what it was reasonable for him to do."
31  In Metropolitan 
Club v. Hopper (1927), for example, the secretary of a club ordered, without authority 
from the club, supplies for a restaurant company operating in the club building.  The club 
would not have been liable, except that it regularly received and ignored copies of the 
bills.  Consequently, it was estopped from denying that the secretary was acting as its 
authorized agent.  
 
Estoppel has two special features in contrast to other sources of liability (Steffen, 
1977, at 128).  First, the third party’s recovery is limited to the losses caused by the 
principal’s failure to prevent the mistake, rather than including expectation damages.  
Strictly speaking, the principal’s failure does not make an invalid agreement into a 
contract; it just makes the principal liable for damages.  If there is no reliance by the third 
party, no recovery is possible.  Second, estoppel is a one-way street.  The third party can 
obtain damages from the principal, but the principal cannot enforce the agreement against 
the third party (unless it is made valid by ratification, as discussed below).  Estoppel is a 
concept from the common law of tort and evidence, not contract.  These features make it 
even clearer that the driving idea is the least-cost avoider principle, rather than any of the 
other theories of contract law.  The BMW Case shows this in its plaintiff’s use of 
negligence and agency theories. 
 
The BMW Case.  Cullen paid an auto dealer for a car which was never delivered.  The 
manufacturer, BMW, had terminated its relationship with the dealer due to customer 
complaints and financial irregularities, but he continued to sell from his inventory of 
BMW cars and to use the BMW logo. (Cullen v. BMW, 1980)   
 
BMW did not give actual authority to the dealer, nor, one may argue, did it give 
apparent authority by its manifestations.  Rather, after terminating what might have been 
                                                           
31Restatement,  §8Bc, which notes that nonfeasance also estops a landowner who fails to prevent 
someone else who believes himself the owner from making improvements on it (Restatement of 
Restitution, 40, 43) or a landowner who fails to prevent someone else from selling his land to a 
bona fide purchaser  (Restatement of Torts, §894, (2)).                                                       
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apparent authority, BMW neglected to stop the dealer from continuing to use the BMW 
name, and hence, the Court said, was estopped from denying agency.  
  
 
5. Ratification   
 
   Ratification, the fifth source of liability, occurs when the principal assents to an 
agreement after it is made by someone who lacks authority.  Ratification is similar to 
actual express authority, because when the principal ratifies the agreement he is saying 
that he sees no mistake worth the cost of renegotiation.  The principal will be the least-
cost avoider for the same reason as when the agent has actual express authority.  Even 
ratification has its nuances, however, as shown in the following case of ratification by 
silence. 
  
The Silent Client Case.  The State of New York appropriated land owned by Hallock and 
Phillips, with payment, and they took the matter to court.  They told their lawyer not to 
settle the case in a particular way, but the lawyer did anyway.  Phillips stood by without 
objecting at the settlement conference, and Hallock waited two months to object.  Was 
Hallock bound by the settlement? (Hallock v. State, 1984)    
 
The Court ruled that Hallock was bound by the settlement, and based its decision 
on ratification, even though it might have emphasized that New York court rules (in 
contrast to the Pennsylvania statute in the Lawyer Madnick Case) required that attorneys 
at pretrial conferences have authority to bind their clients to settlements. 
 
Again, we see the difficulty of naming the appropriate legal doctrine.  This could 
be ratification, agency by estoppel, apparent authority, or even, based on the New York 
court rules, implied actual authority or inherent agency power.  Yet it is easy to see that 
Hallock was the least-cost avoider. 
 
 
6. Inherent Agency Power  
 
The last source of liability, inherent agency power, returns us to Watteau v. 
Fenwick, here abstracted as Illustration 5. 
 
Illustration 5:  Express Instructions Violated.  P buys A’s tavern and hires him as 
manager, instructing him not to buy cigars for the tavern.  A orders cigars for the tavern 
anyway, from TP, who believes A to be the owner.  Must P honor the agreement?  
       
A lacks actual authority to buy cigars, because of P’s instructions, and lacks 
apparent authority because TP does not believe A to be P’s agent.  P’s liability is based 
on inherent agency power:  A has been put into a situation, where he can impose losses on 
third parties unless P is made liable.
32  
                                                           
32Note that A, as well as P, is liable to TP also in situations where inherent agency power is 
invoked because of an undisclosed principal.  This is different from most of the other sources of 
authority, though A may also be liable in cases of estoppel, and this will be discussed in Section                                                  
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The least-cost avoider principle reaches the same result, because P can control A 
more cheaply than can TP.  Not only do the arguments made earlier for P’s lower cost of 
mistake avoidance apply, but the fact that P is undisclosed strengthens the argument 
because TP does not even realize there is an agency problem.  
 
Agents making false representations, the situations where inherent agency power 
is applied, create a variety of special cases (see Section 4.B and 5.C), not all of which 
isolate the principal as the least-cost avoider.  The least-cost avoider principle is a more 
coherent explanation for how courts make decision. 
 
   Thus, every one of the six sources of liability can be justified by the least-cost 
avoider principle.  It can be difficult to decide for a given case which of the six sources of 
agent authority is decisive, but it is often easier to decide who is the least-cost avoider.  
That idea runs through all six principles, and gives a single efficiency justification for all 
of them.  
 
 
7.  Tort and Agency Doctrines Compared  
 
As discussed earlier, the agency law of contracts is really a mix of tort and 
contract.  There is damage that might occur, and two parties (plus the agent) who might 
take care to prevent it, as in tort.  As in contract, the efficiency loss from having the 
wrong default law is usually limited to the transaction cost of writing an improved rule 
into the contract--- but sometimes, as in tort, this cannot be done, because it is the 
wayward agent who would have help with doing the writing.   
 
A natural question is how the six agency doctrines relate to tort doctrines such as 
contributory negligence and strict liability.  In tort terms, we may think of the principal 
having caused injury to the third party by allowing the execution of an agreement whose 
non-enforcement will be to the third party’s detriment.  (It will not hurt the analogy that 
the reverse is equally plausible, since here, unlike in tort, there is no actual injury until 
the court decides whether or not to enforce the contract.)   
 
Tort doctrines look to how the carelessness of one or both parties led to the 
damage.  Being careless is called being “negligent”, which is equivalent to exercising 
inefficiently little care under the Hand Rule, but might be defined under some other 
standard such as industry custom (see Epstein, 1992).  Suppose the third party, and only 
the third party, was negligent.  In tort, the principal is liable for the damage only under 
the doctrine of strict liability.  In agency, this corresponds to the doctrine of actual 
authority.  The agent has actual authority to execute the agreement, then it does not 
matter how careless the third party was in checking that authority:  the agreement is a 
contract and the principal must honor it.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                             
5.  This is also different from vicarious liability, to which inherent agency power is often 
analogized, since the agent is not liable for his torts.                                                   
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If it is only the principal that is negligent, then he is liable under tort, and 
similarly under agency.  This is the essence of apparent authority:  the principal has given 
the agent opportunity to deceive the third party, and so the principal must honor any 
agreements made.  Inherent agency power would seem to fit under the same heading:  the 
principal’s lack of care has led to the mistaken agreement, and the third party cannot be 
expected to compensate.  
 
If neither party is negligent, then tort doctrine ordinarily lets losses lie where they 
fall— giving the third party no relief, in our framework.  This is efficient because to 
allow access to the courts for relief would result in excess care by one or both parties, 
they already having had sufficient incentive to exercise efficient care.  If, for example, 
the agent has so cleverly forged his credentials that efficient monitoring by the principal 
and efficient checking by the third party would not detect it, then he does not have 
authority to make the contract, and the courts will not enforce it.  
 
In tort, as in agency, finding the efficient law is most difficult when both parties 
have taken insufficient care.  Under tort, the doctrine of contributory negligence would 
bar relief for the third party if not just the principal but he himself were negligent in 
monitoring the agent.  This might be modified by the comparative negligence doctrine, 
under which the costs of the mistake are shared (see, e.g., Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 1975, or 
Landes and Posner, 1987, pp. 80-84), or by the last clear chance doctrine, under which 
the principal would still be liable if he had the last opportunity in time to prevent the 
harm (see, e.g., Belton v. Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth., Williams, J., 1994, or 
Landes and Posner, 1987, pp. 92-95). 
 
Comparative negligence has no analog in agency law, though Whincop (1997) has 
proposed that costs be split according to the degree of carelessness of the principal and 
the third party.  The last clear chance doctrine, however, has clear analogs in authority by 
estoppel and ratification.  The essence of these is that whatever may have contributed to 
the mistake earlier, if the principal fails to correct the problem when he could easily do so 
then the court will force him to honor it.  (The contract doctrine of mitigation of damages 
is also similar in flavor.)  We will also see examples below of the last mover bearing the 
cost of mistakes—examples in which the decisive consideration is the third party’s lack 
of care at the time of contracting.    
  
 
B.  When Should the Third Party Bear the Cost of Mistaken Contracts?  
 
In the illustrations in Section 4.A, the principal was the least-cost avoider of error, 
as one would usually expect, given his control over the identity and incentives of the 
agent.  "Usually" is not "invariably", however.  The third party has the advantage of 
being present at the time of contracting, and so has available at low cost additional 
information relevant to whether the purported agent is taking a wrong action.    
 
 
1.  Care to Check Authority                                                  
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Illustration 6:  Not Checking Authority Carefully.  "P tells TP that A is authorized to buy 
sheep for him when the market price of wool in another country has reached a certain 
point.  TP sells sheep to A, relying upon A’s untruthful statement that the price of wool 
has reached the specified point."
33  Is P bound by the agreement? (Restatement, §168) 
 
 According to the Restatement,  P is not bound in Illustration 6.  TP is the least-
cost avoider, because his cost of verifying A’s claim is lower than the cost to P of 
ensuring that A does not make false claims.   P does have means to prevent the false 
claims--- through threat of discharge, if nothing else--- but the cost for TP to check the 
claims is lower.    
 
The outcome would be different if it were more costly for TP to discover the 
information on which A’s authority relies.  We have already seen in Watteau v. Fenwick 
that secret instructions do not protect P.  This is equally true of information known to A 
but not to P or TP.  If P authorizes A to buy one sheep, and tells TP that A may be coming 
by to do so, then P is bound by A’s purchase from TP even if A had previously terminated 
his authority by buying a different sheep from someone else (Restatement,§171).    
 
It is crucial whether the information available to the third party should lead him to 
take special care to check authority, as seen in the following three cases, in which a bailee 
improperly disposes of goods entrusted to him.
34   
 
The Delicatessen as Art Gallery Case.  Porter loaned a painting to Von Maker, who hired 
deli employee Wertz to sell it to Brenner via dealer Feigen.  Porter sued Feigen for return 
of the painting.  Should he win? (Porter v. Wertz, 1979)     
 
 The Court decided, however, that Wertz was not an art merchant in the sense of 
the Uniform Commercial Code, and that Feigen ought to have taken the precaution of 
telephoning one of the numbers Wertz gave him, which would have revealed his 
employment at the delicatessen.
35  Feigen argued that industry practice in the art business 
                                                           
33See the similar Mussey v. Beecher (1849).  The defendant authorized his agent to buy up to 
$2,000 in books for his store.  The agent bought more than that amount, and ordered even more 
from the plaintiff, falsely telling the plaintiff that the limit was not yet exceeded.  Judge Shaw 
ruled for the defendant.    
34Bailment is the rightful possession of goods by someone who is not their owner.  A bailee is "a 
species of agent", his duty limited to taking care of certain items of movable property (Black’s, p. 
141).  Black's is loose here.  Some agents are bailees, but not all bailees are agents.  "While a 
bailment is frequently incident to the relation of principal and agent, such relation does not exist 
where the bailor has no control over the bailee, even though the acts of the bailee benefit the 
bailor." (Jones v. Taylor, 1966, at 186) 
35 Under the Uniform Commercial Code, giving temporary possession to a merchant blocks 
recovery from a third party if the merchant sells the good.  "(2) Any entrusting of possession of 
goods to a merchant who deals in goods of that kind gives him power to transfer all rights of the 
entruster to a buyer in ordinary course of business. (3) `Entrusting’ includes any delivery and any 
acquiescence in retention of possession regardless of any condition expressed between the parties 
to the delivery or acquiescence and regardless of whether the procurement of the entrusting or the                                                  
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was to not inquire into the backgrounds of one’s customers.  The Court rejected this, 
saying, 
 
The Feigen claim that the failure to look into Wertz’s authority to sell the 
painting was consistent with the practice of the trade does not excuse such conduct.  This 
claim merely confirms the observation of the trial court that `in an industry whose 
transactions cry out for verification of title it is deemed poor practice to probe’.  Indeed, 
commercial indifference to ownership or the right to sell facilitates traffic in stolen works 
of art.  Commercial indifference diminishes the integrity and increases the culpability of 
the apathetic merchant.
36 (at 258).    
   
The following case makes much the same point:  the third party has a duty to 
investigate suspicious sales. 
 
The New Jersey Diamond Case.  Wolf consigned a diamond ring to auction company 
Brand with written instructions not to sell it without permission.  Brand borrowed $4,000 
from Nelson, using the ring as collateral for that loan and for a previously bounced check 
to Nelson.  Nelson then purchased the ring from Brand in return for cancelling the loan, 
but without a written bill of sale.  He consigned the ring back to Brand, who returned it to 
Wolf.  Can Nelson recover the ring? (Nelson v. Wolf, 1950) 
 
Nelson did not recover the ring in this pre-U.C.C. case, because although he did 
not know all these facts, (a) he knew Brand needed money and had bounced a check, (b) 
he knew Brand had trouble repaying the loan, (c) the lack of a bill of sale was suspicious, 
and (d) he was not an ordinary customer.  Contrast this what happened three years later: 
 
The New York Diamond Case.  Diamond merchant Harry Winston sent a diamond ring to 
auction company Brand for examination, with written instructions not to sell it without 
permission, and allowed Brand to display it publicly.  Brand then sold it to Jane 
Zendman.  Does she own the ring?  (Zendman v. Harry Winston, 1953---yes, it’s the 
same auction company as in the New Jersey Diamond Case.)    
    
The Court gave title to Zendman, since she, an ordinary customer, had no reason 
to be suspicious.  In addition (important in this pre-U.C.C. case), Winston had allowed 
public display of the ring together with Brand’s other merchandise.  The principal had not 
taken care, and the third party could not, so the principal bore the loss.
37      
 
It is an easy step from these cases to ones involving stolen goods, a topic to which 
some of the leading scholars in law and economics have given attention (e.g. Landes and 
Posner, 1996, and Levmore, 1987).  There, the law must decide whether to give 
                                                                                                                                                                             
possessor’s disposition of the goods have been such as to be larcenous under the criminal law." 
(U.C.C. §2-403)     
36 Porter v. Wertz (1979) at 258.  This reasoning is similar to the issue of whether industry custom 
is a defense in tort cases such as Learned Hand’s The T.J. Hooper (1932). Epstein (1992) 
explores the difference between tort and contract on the issue of whether industry custom should 
be a defense against negligence.  
37The UCC changed the law by not requiring a showing of lack of care by P., perhaps changing 
the common law rule because telephone had made P’s care cheaper.                                                   
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possession of stolen goods to the original owner or to someone who bought them from a 
thief, and the efficient rule depends on how the effort of each party could be used to deter 
the theft.
38      
 
 
2.  The Third Party Has Immediate Information about the Transaction 
  
A second reason why TP may be the least-cost avoider is that he is on the spot at 
the time of contracting and can observe the agent’s behavior. 
 
Illustration 7:  Incapacity of the Agent.  P hires A as an agent to buy goods from TP.  
While intoxicated, A orders the wrong goods from TP, who knows that A is intoxicated.  
Must P pay for the goods?   
 
P should not have to pay for the goods, because it is TP who has the least cost of 
monitoring A’s sobriety.
39  If TP has no way of knowing that A is intoxicated, the answer 
is more difficult.
40  Contract law does not premise lack of capacity on the knowledge of 
the other party of that lack.  Here, however, P stands behind A, and can take measures to 
prevent him from contracting while intoxicated.  If P has hired a habitual drunkard as his 
agent, P surely should bear the loss from A’s frivolous agreements.   
  
 
3.  Collusion between Agent and Third Party   
 
A third reason to release the principal from liability is if the third party colludes 
with the agent against him. 
  
Illustration 8:  Collusion with the Agent.  "TP sells a horse to A, P’s authorized agent.  TP 
represents the horse to be sound.  A knows the horse to be unsound.  P does not have this 
knowledge."  Is P bound by the agreement? (Restatement, §144) 
 
The Restatement bases the result in Illustration 8 on the additional fact, 
unmentioned in Illustration 8, of whether TP and A have colluded.  Note first that TP’s 
misrepresentation is not the cause of the erroneous purchase, which it would have been 
had he been selling directly to P, because A was not fooled by it.  Therefore, if there was 
no collusion between TP and A, P would be bound by the contract; he could have gone to 
the trouble to hire a more responsible agent than A.  Or, it might be that in A’s judgement, 
TP’s interests are served by buying an unsound horse.  If TP had been colluding with A, 
                                                           
38Carrying the idea further still, it has been suggested that criminal penalties should be set to less 
than the cost of the theft (Hylton, 1996; Friedman, 1996), or that victim carelessness should be a 
defense for the criminal (Ben-Shahar and Harel, 1995), both of which would encourage victim 
precaution.   
39Lack of capacity is a standard formation defense for breach of contract.  See the Restatement 
(Second) of Contracts, §18.    
40Restatement, §122 seems to say that the contract remains invalid: the agent’s authority to 
contract ends after an event which "deprives the agent of capacity to make the principal a party to 
it."                                                   
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on the other hand, the contract would be invalid, because (a)  the likelihood that A is 
acting in P’s interests drops sharply, and (b)  TP could have prevented the harm by 
refraining from colluding with A, a very low cost to TP.
41     
   
The unenforceability of corrupt agreements might be based on any of a number of 
grounds, including fairness, prevention of gain to evildoers, and the corruption of public 
morality, but, interestingly enough, the U.S. Supreme Court chose to base it on legal 
doctrine and economic efficiency, in a case involving bribes to corporate officers to 
choose a particular route for a railroad: 
 
"Indeed, the law is general that agreements upon pecuniary considerations, or the 
promise of them, to influence the conduct of officers charged with duties affecting the 
public interest, or with duties of a fiduciary character to private parties, are against the 
true policy of the State, which is to secure fidelity in the discharge of all such duties.  
Agreements of that character introduce mercenary considerations to control the conduct 
of parties, instead of considerations arising from the nature of their duties and the most 
efficient way of discharging them.  (Justice Field, Woodstock Iron Company v. Richmond 
and Danville Extension, 1889, at 662)   
 
 More generally, Restatement, §165 releases the principal from liability to third 
parties for contracts made by agents when the third party knows that the agent is not 
acting for the benefit of the principal.  This would not always release the principal from 
liability from a contract obtained by bribery--- maybe the third party needs to bribe the 
agent to do his job properly!--- but it will cover most cases.  Thus, the third party is made 
responsible for monitoring the agent if the direct cost of so doing is zero. 
 
George Cohen (2000, at 28) has made collusion the basis for an alternative to the 
least-cost avoider principal as an explanation for agency law, arguing that "…the law of 
contractual authority can largely be understood as an attempt by courts to draw a line 
between situations in which it is appropriate to presume principal-agent collusion, and 
situations in which it is more appropriate to switch the presumption to agent-third party 
collusion."  I just discussed agent-third-party collusion, and suggest that its treatment is 
an example of the least-cost avoider principal at work.  This is generally true, because 
where there is a possibility that the agent and principal might collude, agreeing that the 
principal will be liable for the agent’s agreements where convenient but not otherwise, 
the third party can always overcome the collusion by incurring the transaction cost of 
checking the agent’s formal authority.  The difference between the two theories—least-
cost avoider and collusion—is that collusion is a subset of least-cost avoider.  If there is 
collusion, whoever is colluding has the least cost of forestalling contracts that are 
inefficient ex ante.  The least-cost avoider principle, however, also applies to situations 
where there is no collusion—for example, where the agent absconds with all the funds, to 
the benefit of neither principal nor third party, or where the agent simply makes mistakes 
with no strategic intent.  Collusion is a better explanation for agency contract law only if 
                                                           
41Another example of the idea that collusion releases the principal from an agreement can be 
found in international law.  Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations, §331(1)(c) allows a 
government to invalidate an international agreement entered into by a corrupt agent.                                                     
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such examples are much rarer than cases where collusion is the chief danger—something 
I believe to be untrue.  
   
 
4.  Obvious Agent Malfeasance   
 
A fourth reason to release the principal from liability is if the agent’s malfeasance 
should be obvious to the third party from the terms of the agreement.
42           
 
Illustration 9:  Obvious Agent Malfeasance.  P authorizes A to buy a refrigerator for him.  
TP has listed a refrigerator for sale at $400, but A offers $700 if it can be delivered 
slightly more quickly.  TP knows that A is an agent for P and that P would not value 
speed of delivery at $300.  Is P bound by the agreement? 
        
According to the Restatement, "Unless otherwise agreed, authority to buy or sell 
with no price specified in terms includes authority to buy or sell at the market price if 
any; otherwise at a reasonable price.” (Restatement, §61)  This implies that P is not 
bound by the agreement in Illustration 9.  TP has the least cost of controlling the agent’s 
misbehavior because he is on the spot, unlike P.  The price of $700 is so excessive that it 
should be easy for TP to see that A is misrepresenting his authority from P.   
   
If the price paid had only been $450, the mistake would not be so clear.  An extra 
$50 is not an unreasonable premium for speed, and it is not easy for TP to tell that A is 
misbehaving.  The cost to P of preventing overpayment, on the other hand, is little 
different whether the amount is $50 or $300.  The least-cost avoider principle suggests 
that P should be liable for small mistakes, but not for large ones.
43  The following case 
similarly involves an offer that is too good to be true. 
  
The Corrupt Treasurer Case.  Kraft, the treasurer of Anaconda, guaranteed on its behalf 
repayment of a loan made by Haggiag via his company GOF to Robin, a company owned 
by one Reisini.  Reisini and Kraft were in collusion, contrary to the interests of 
Anaconda.  Kraft did not have actual authority to guarantee the loan, but he managed to 
fool six banks into extending credit of various kinds to Reisini.  The loan went bad.  Can 
GOF collect from Anaconda? (General Overseas Films, Ltd. v. Robin Int’l, Inc., 1982)  
 
The Court recognized that Haggiag could not have acquired more information 
about Kraft’s authority at reasonable cost, since, "... had Haggiag inquired further into 
Kraft’s authority, he would not have discovered anything to cast doubt upon the 
transactions’ propriety, since Kraft was the person at Anaconda authorized to produce 
evidence as to both the authority to transact business on behalf of Anaconda and any 
changes in that authority." (at 690)  Haggiag lost his suit, however, because the loan 
                                                           
42A plaintiff "claiming reliance on (an) agent’s apparent authority must not fail to heed warning 
or inconsistent circumstances." (Williston, 1957, at 227) 
43Recall Restatement §165, discussed earlier, which says that the principal is not bound when the 
third party knows the agent is not acting for the principal’s benefit.  There is no duty for the third 
party to inquire more than superficially, but egregious misbehavior should be detected by the 
third party.                                                     
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guarantee was not in Anaconda’s usual line of business.  The six banks that also trusted 
Kraft all took more precautions and sought more explanation’s for Anaconda’s interest, 
though it is still not clear whether they would have collected from Anaconda had their 
cases not settled out of court.   
 
   What these various cases show is that the third party is indeed sometimes the 
least-cost avoider, and courts recognize this in deciding whether doctrines such as 
apparent authority apply. 
   
 
5.  The Undisclosed Principal Problem 
     
This variety of illustrations has shown that the least-cost avoider principle can be 
useful in guiding agency law. This section will apply it to one of the most vexing areas of 
agency law:  the undisclosed principal problem. 
 
 
A.  The Undisclosed Principal Problem   
  
The undisclosed principal problem arises when an agent makes an agreement with 
a third party who does not realize that the agent is acting for a principal rather than on his 
own behalf.  The question then arises of whether the third party has a legal claim against 
the principal as well as against the agent.  Watteau v. Fenwick is particularly dramatic 
because the agent acted against the express wishes of the principal, but the problem exists 
even if the agent is obedient, as in Illustration 10.  
  
Illustration 10: The Undisclosed Principal Problem.  A agrees to buy goods from TP.  A 
represents P, unknown to TP.  Is P bound by the agreement? 
 
Ordinary contract law says that A and TP are bound by the contract.  Agency law 
agrees, but says that P is also bound, which is difficult to justify under the usual 
jurisprudential theories of contract law.
44  The rule violates the standard will theories of 
contract.  As the Restatement says,  
  
The undisclosed principal rule appears to violate basic principles of contract law. 
The relation between principal and a person with whom the agent has made an authorized 
contract is spoken of as contractual, although by definition there has been no 
manifestation of consent by the third person to the principal or by the principal to him. 
(Restatement, §186) 
  
The rule is no better explained by the bargain theory or reliance theory of 
contract.  The bargain theory looks to whether the two parties bargained with each other.  
                                                           
44This discussion is drawn from Barnett (1987), who provides references to the case law and 
evidence of the discomfort of common law scholars with the undisclosed principal rule. Barnett 
briefly discusses efficiency theories of contract, but objects to them as not providing a normative 
theory of contractual obligation.                                                    
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TP did not knowingly bargain with P, and making P liable provides TP with a benefit for 
which he did not bargain.  The reliance theory looks to whether the two parties 
reasonably rely on each other’s promises.  TP does not rely on P’s promises, because he 
does not know that P exists.
45     
 
 An efficiency theory of contract law has an easier time explaining the 
undisclosed principal rule.  In Illustration 10, the contract is desirable from the point of 
view of both P and TP, unless we add special details such as an unwillingness of TP to 
sell to P at as low a price as to A (about which more in Section B).  TP is getting a 
windfall by this contract, because not only is A bound to pay him, but so, unknown to TP, 
is P.  Thus, there is no puzzle at all from the point of view of efficiency.       
 
The least-cost avoider principle enters usefully if we add agent malfeasance to the 
illustration.  If A has an undisclosed principal, then TP’s cost of preventing A from 
making an inefficient contract is greater than P’s.  TP, who does not even know that A is 
an agent, should be allowed to take even less care than if he knew A were an agent.  
Consider again Illustration 9, in which A pays $700 for a refrigerator that normally costs 
$400.  The Restatement seems to indicate that P is released from obligation regardless of 
whether he is disclosed or undisclosed.  The least-cost avoider principle says that the 
court should think harder about releasing P if he is undisclosed, because TP has less 
reason to be suspicious and to investigate.  Without knowing that A is an agent, TP has no 
reason to doubt that A has some personal reason for paying a large premium for speedy 
delivery.   
 
The rule that undisclosed principals are bound by their agents’ contracts also 
usefully encompasses situations in which the agent has used the resources of the principal 
to appear wealthy and dependable.  In such situations, a contract between A and TP 
without obligation to P could be mistaken, because TP would falsely believe that A was 
creditworthy.  Watteau v. Fenwick is one such case: the manager seemed more 
creditworthy because he appeared to own the tavern.  Indeed, the very act of placing an 
order may make an agent seem more dependable. If an individual orders ten thousand 
dollars worth of replacement parts for a power plant, it is natural to suppose that he is 
acting on behalf of a larger business.   
 
That TP receives a windfall because he did not rely on P’s credit when entering 
into the contract does raise concerns, however.  If TP has the option of enforcing the 
contract against P, he has gained an advantage for which he had not bargained with A:  if 
A is insolvent, TP can sue P instead.  This windfall matters not only for fairness but 
efficiency, as the various forms of Illustration 11 show.  
 
Illustration 11.1:  No Principal.  A, who owns no assets, orders goods on credit from TP 
which cost $90 to produce.  If there is no recession, A can resell the goods for $105, 
                                                           
45Barnett (1987) shows that his own “consent theory" of contract does explain the common law 
rules of the undisclosed principal problem.  This theory looks to whether (a) the subject of the 
contract is a morally cognizable and alienable right owned by the transferor and (b) the transferor 
manifests his consent to transfer the right.                                                    
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while if there is a recession, which occurs with a 10 percent probability, the goods are 
worth nothing.  The contract takes the form of a contract price of $101, and A breaches if 
a recession occurs.   
  
Illustration 11.2:  Principal and Windfall.  The same as 11.1, except: A is backed by 
undisclosed principal P, who must honor the contract and will not become insolvent in 
doing so.  TP believes the probability that A is backed by an undisclosed principal is 
negligible and so still insists on a contract price of $101.  A contract price of $101, would 
yield negative profits for P, so no agreement is reached. 
  
Illustration 11.3:  Principal, No Windfall.  The same as 11.2 except:  The legal rule is 
that P is not a party to the contract, and so need not pay damages if A breaches.  A 
contract price of $101 would yield positive profits for P, and so agreement is reached. 
   
 In each of the variants it is efficient for TP to sell the goods to A, but in 11.2, in 
which the undisclosed principal is bound, agreement is not reached.  He would authorize 
A to make the contract if undisclosed principals were not liable, but not otherwise.  Thus, 
there is indeed a potential efficiency loss associated with making undisclosed principals 
liable on contracts.  Some mutually beneficial contracts will not be made, because TP 
does not know how valuable the contract being offered to him is.   
 
Could the windfall be avoided by special contract terms?  A maxim of the law and 
economics of contract is that if transaction costs are low, the parties will customize their 
contract regardless of the legal default rule, so an inefficient default rule can cause only a 
limited amount of harm. This might seem to be a way out of the undisclosed principal 
problem, as in Illustration 12.   
 
Illustration 12:  Special Contract Terms.  A agrees to buy goods from TP, but the contract 
specifically excludes any liability on the part of anyone but A and TP.  A represents P, 
unknown to TP.  Is P bound by the agreement?  
 
P has no obligation to TP here (Restatement, §189), but it may be difficult to 
write a contract of this kind because asymmetric information creates serious trouble for 
this contract maxim.
46  If A proposes a term exempting other parties from liability, TP 
can deduce that A is backed by a principal, which is information that A may not wish to 
disclose.  Very often there are legitimate business reasons why P wants his involvement 
to be secret.  He may, for example, be trying to buy up parcels of land to combine for a 
project such as a shopping center and needs to avoid being held up by the last purchaser, 
who could extract an enormous price for the parcel needed to complete the project, or be 
a mining company which has at considerable expense decided that a parcel of land has 
mining potential, but does not want to deliver this information as a windfall to the current 
owner by trying to purchase the land under the mining’s company’s own name.  If most 
agents wished to exempt their principals from liability, it would be important to make this 
exemption the default rule, or perhaps even to make it mandatory.  
                                                           
46A number of articles have appeared in recent years showing how parties may be reluctant to 
propose special contractual terms, or to object to adding terms, because such actions would reveal 
their private information. See Ayres and Gertner (1989) and Spier (1992).                                                    
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 Whether because of the windfall problem or for some other reason, there is one 
class of undisclosed principal cases where American courts have usually exempted the 
principal from liability: that where credit is extended to the agent.  This class is described 
in Illustration 13.   
 
Illustration 13: Principal Pays but Agent Breaches.  A agrees to buy goods from TP, and 
TP delivers the goods.  Unknown to TP, A is an agent for P.  P pays A the money for the 
goods, but A becomes insolvent before paying TP. Can TP sue P for payment?   
 
 Traditionally, American courts would deny TP the right to sue P, on the grounds 
that TP relied only on A’s credit, but English courts and the Restatement, would give TP 
the right to sue (Barnett, 1987, at 1973, 1984; Restatement, §208).  The least-cost avoider 
principle leads to the English rule.  P has the least cost of inducing A to make an efficient 
contract, and also has the least cost of preventing A from losing the payment money 
before transferring it to TP.   
 
Thus, the standard rule, which makes the undisclosed principal liable on his 
agent’s contract, makes perfect sense if efficiency is the goal and the least-cost avoider 
principal is applied.  Ordinarily such a contract will be efficient, and if a mishap occurs, it 




B.  Liability of the Third Party to the Principal   
 
A different part of the undisclosed principal problem is the obligation of the third 
party to the principal.  Should TP be bound contractually to a party he did not know 
existed?  Illustrations 14 and 15 contrast two situations in which TP would have regrets 
about the contract if he knew that P existed.  
 
Illustration 14: Inadvertent Sale to an Enemy.  TP agrees to sell goods to A, who, 
unknown to TP, is an agent for P. TP and P are bitter enemies, and TP would never 
willingly sell goods to P, as A and P know.  TP later discovers that A is acting for P.  Is 
TP bound by the agreement?        
 
Illustration 15: Inadvertent Sale to a Rich Buyer.  TP agrees to sell goods to A, who, 
unknown to TP, is an agent for P.  P is very rich, and TP would have held out for a higher 
price if he had known P was interested in the goods.  TP later discovers that A is acting 
for P.  Is TP bound by the agreement?  
 
In both illustrations, TP would have been willing to sell to A at the specified price, 
but not to P.  Where they differ is in TP’s motivation.  In Illustration 14, TP’s motive is 
real, rather than redistributive.  TP’s utility from holding the goods himself is greater than 
the sum of his utility from the sale price to P plus the disutility of knowing that P has 
bought the goods.  The result is analogous to when a purchaser buys a defective product:                                                  
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the utility he expects from the transaction is less than the utility he receives. Thus, there is 
a case for invalidating the sale.
47      
 
  In Illustration 15, on the other hand, TP’s motive is redistributive.  TP’s utility 
from holding the goods himself is less than his utility from the sale price to P, and he 
would prefer the agreed sale price to not selling the goods at all. TP is dissatisfied, but 
that is only because he could have received an even higher price if he had known that P 
was the ultimate buyer.  Thus, the transfer of the goods from TP to P is allocatively 
efficient, and there is no reason to invalidate the agreement. 
 
  Even in Illustration 14, however, it is not clear that exempting TP from liability 
for contracts with undisclosed principals is advisable.  First, there is the difficulty that if 
the law exempted TP from liability, P could simply contract with A to buy the goods and 
A could buy the good from TP on his own authority, without risk to either P or A since 
they are protected from each other by their contract.  Thus, exempting TP from liability 
to P as an undisclosed principal would just increase P’s transaction costs slightly.  The 
obvious solution to this possibility is for TP to add a special contractual term forbidding 
resale to P or, if the legal default rule is that third parties are not bound to undisclosed 
principals, by adding a clause to override that default if the hated P is the undisclosed 
principal.  Unlike in Illustration 12, where a similar clause faced the difficulty that it 
might signal the existence of an undisclosed principal, here the clause would be proposed 
by the third party, and so does not disclose any information except his dislike for P, 
which he does not mind disclosing.  
 
A similar clause could be inserted in the contract of Illustration 15, to prevent an 
agent from acting on behalf of a rich principal or reselling to one.  Airlines do this when 
they forbid one customer from using a ticket bought by another apparently on his own 
behalf, and movie theatres would no doubt start doing this if they found that ordinary 
customers were hiring students or senior citizens to buy cheap tickets on their behalf.  
 
Thus, there is a strong case for making third parties liable to undisclosed 
principals, subject to their right to override the legal default in general or with regard to 
specific principals.  
 
 
C.  An Agent Acting Outside of His Authority   
 
  Section 4.A discussed why the principal should be liable when the agent has 
various categories of authority.  A final puzzle in the undisclosed principal problem is 
what should happen when an undisclosed agent acts without authority.  Should the 
                                                           
47Steffen (1977) at 188 says that if the third party has once refused to deal with the principal, the 
principal may not circumvent the refusal by using a secret agent, according to most courts.  When 
the third party’s desires are less objectively manifested, courts are less likely to intervene.  An 
example is Kelly Asphalt Block Co. v. Barber Asphalt Paving Co. (1914), in which Judge 
Cardozo held for a buyer who had remained an undisclosed principal because he suspected a 
competitor would refuse to deal with him.                                                      
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undisclosed principal be liable?  The question at first seems trivial--of course he should 
not--but the principal might have the least cost of preventing mistakes by the agent even 
when the mistakes are unconnected with the principal’s purpose in hiring him.  
Illustration 16 is an example.  
 
Illustration 16: An Agent Acting on his Own Behalf.  "P authorizes A to purchase a 
particular horse in A’s name and gives A the money to do so.  A purchases the horse on 
his own credit, without disclosing P’s existence, intending to abscond with horse and 
money, which he subsequently does." (Restatement, §199).  Is P liable to TP, the seller of 
the horse?   
 
If P were a disclosed principal and A bought the horse on P’s credit, A’s 
motivation would not matter and P would be liable.  That would make sense,  because P 
could control A at lower cost than TP.   
 
   Since P is undisclosed, however, Illustration 16 is hard to distinguish from the 
ordinary undisclosed principal problem of Illustration 10.  In both, the issue is whether P 
should be liable for a mistaken contract when A cannot pay, both P and TP have lost 
wealth, and TP does not know of P’s existence.  Why should A’s motivation matter?  
 
According to the Restatement, P is not liable, because A is not acting as his agent.  
Let us see why this makes sense.  Consider P’s incentives in deciding whether to hire A.  
In Illustration 16, where A is acting on behalf of P, the contract would not have been 
made had P not set the process in motion.  If contracting by means of an agent sometimes 
leads to harm, P ought to bear the cost, or he will be too willing to use an agent.  That is 
what happened in Illustration 10, where A would never have approached TP to buy a 
horse if P had not hired him as an agent.  P’s hiring of an agent who might lose money, 
go insolvent, or otherwise ruin transactions is somewhat under P’s control and is not at 
all under TP’s.  Illustration 16 is different because P’s hiring of A in no way caused the 
harm.  If P had never hired A, A could still have done the same thing, agreeing to buy the 
horse from TP and absconding.  That A’s action is to abscond with a horse is irrelevant; if 
A had taken P’s money and absconded with TP’s bicycle instead, the problem would be 
essentially the same.  Only if A’s ability to credibly make the contract to buy the horse 
depended on his relationship with P-- a situation like Watteau v. Fenwick--should P be 
liable.  Otherwise, the harm does not result from P’s desire to buy a horse using an agent, 
and it would be inefficient to impose an extra cost on that activity by making P liable for 
A’s misdeeds.  
 
The point that the principal should not be liable for harm caused by an agent 
acting without authority can be applied more generally.  Although it may offend everyday 
notions of fairness, one might argue on efficiency grounds that the principal should be 
liable for harm caused by the agent even if all of Section 2’s six sources of liability are 
lacking, because the principal can still control the agent by means of his contract.    
 
This is the same argument made for strict liability, where the moral fault may lie 
with the consumer who misuses a product, but efficiency conceivably requires the 
liability to be put on the seller.  Let us start with agent torts rather than contracts.  The                                                  
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legal rule of vicarious liability is that the principal is liable only for torts the agent 
commits in the course of employment (Restatement, §219).  Imagine going a step further 
by making the principal liable even for the agent’s torts while the agent is on holiday at 
the beach.  The justification would be that the principal can control even those torts by 
threatening to fire the agent if they occur.  Making the principal liable would be 
distortionary, however, because it would tend to deter the hiring of agents.  The extra 
liability on the principal is like a tax on hiring agents.  Thus, it is not enough to discover 
that the principal is the least-cost avoider in controlling agents; one must also decide 
whether imposing the cost of avoiding the harm might deter principals from hiring agents 
in the first place.  
 
 
6.  Concluding Remarks 
  
I have here analyzed the central doctrines of agency as they apply to contracts 
made by agents, and find the common law generally sensible in terms of economic 
efficiency.  Scholars will find the Restatement of Agency a stimulating source of many 
other difficulties that arise when one person acts for another, and there is ample room for 
economic analysis of similar problems that arise when one person acts for another in 
other areas of the law such as partnership, criminal conspiracy, and marriage. 
 
My unifying theme has been the view of the agent as an error-prone means to 
reduce transaction costs, a role in which he is useful to both parties in the transaction, the 
principal and the third party, both of whom can take care to prevent the errors.  This view 
leads naturally to the idea that the liability rules should try to provide each of the two 
transactors with incentive to monitor the agent.  The least-cost avoider principle reduces 
the complexity of assigning liability, which must otherwise be done by applying a 
number of distinct doctrines such as apparent authority and inherent agency power.  
Indeed, the decisions of the common law, while doctrinally somewhat confused, make 
considerable sense when viewed as allocating blame to the party who was the least-cost 
avoider of agent mistakes or malfeasance.  The idea also gives insight into the 
undisclosed principal problem.  Binding an undisclosed principal to pay for contracts 
made by agent, though a windfall for the third party, becomes much more reasonable in 
light of the principal’s lower cost of preventing inefficient agreements from being made 
by the agent.  
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